AbstrAct
Priority alarm messages for MTC in industry applications require guaranteed delays of a few dozen milliseconds only, with super-critical applications even calling for below-10-ms access. With the best state-of-the-art cellular systems barely able to meet below-50-ms delays, in this article we propose some important improvements to the 3GPP MTC access procedure allowing a significantly performance boost for alarm messages. Notably, the first method encompasses an SMSlike approach where the alarm is transmitted in a secure and backward-compatible form over the connection-establishing access channel, thus allowing the data transmission to be terminated significantly earlier and to support emerging critical alarm messages. The second method uses a secure and previously agreed sequence of random access codes to convey super-critical alerts within a few milliseconds, and is thus able to support emergency alarm messages. Both methods not only achieve control-compliant access delays but are also highly energy efficient, thus allowing long battery lifetimes and hence quicker uptake by the industry.
IntroductIon
Machine-to-machine (M2M) refers to the paradigm of having machines (sensors, actuators, etc.) connected and communicating without (or with minimal) human interaction [1] . Apart from autonomous operational requirements, M2M also puts constraints on the energy efficiency of battery-powered machines, computational efficiency of low-complexity embedded devices, lowcost deployment to facilitate scaling, and low latency to support industry-compliant critical control applications [2] .
M2M applications vary enormously [2] ; examples range from smart cities, where sensors report status updates (e.g., on air quality, parking occupancy, lightening conditions), to health care, where sensors report blood pressure, well being, glucose levels, and so on. Other examples are related to the monitoring of industrial sites, pipes, valves, and so on; in this case, access delays of a few milliseconds are desirable to allow closed control loop applications [2] , where, for example, a phasor sensor detects instabilities in the grid requiring parts of a substation to be shunned. Traditionally, these industrial control applications were powered by wired M2M solutions (e.g., field buses and industrial Ethernet). Then, with the ratification of, for example, WirelessHART and ISA100.11a, low-power wireless solutions started to be used in the industry. While offering long lifetimes, these solutions fall short in range due to low transmission powers. This requires mesh networks to be used, which, even with the best design available today, seriously jeopardize end-to-end reliability and delay [3] .
The Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) machine-type communications (MTC) potentially circumvent these problems, where a viable cellular M2M solution ought to have low complexity, low cost, low energy consumption, and short access delays to be of interest to the industrial ecosystem. Various industrial and academic efforts [4, 5] are thus in place to address these issues. Focus is on the random access (RA) in the uplink of the machine, which dictates energy consumption, delay, and complexity. To date, the evolutionary approaches (among them, e.g., prioritized RA [6] ) are generally 3GPP backward compatible but not able to go below 50 ms [7] . The revolutionary approaches (e.g., [8] ), on the other hand, meet the industrial delay requireMassiMo CondoluCi, MisCha dohler, Giuseppe araniti, antonella Molinaro, and JoaChiM saChs
EnhancEd Radio accEss and data tRansmission PRocEduREs Facilitating industRy-comPliant machinE-tyPE communications ovER ltE-BasEd 5g nEtwoRks acc E P t E d F R o m oP E n ca l l ments but are not backward compatible or are based on assumptions that limit their effectiveness in real-world settings (e.g., fixed packet size and modulation/coding scheme). By following the evolutionary path, we introduce in this article two approaches, largely backward compatible with current 3GPP designs, and thus pave the way for successful industry-compliant MTC uptake in fifth generation (5G) networks, the design of which is expected to be aligned with the large and ubiquitous deployments of Long Term Evolution (LTE) systems expected in 2020. The prime design goal is to lower the access delay, which consequently also helps with the energy budget. Both methods allow the standard RA and data transmission procedure, a typical four-message handshake followed by data transmission over dedicated resources, to be terminated more quickly. The first method mimics the short message service (SMS) by transmitting encrypted alarms already in the access channel, piggybacked in RA Msg3; the second method relies on a secure sequence of preambles to allow the base station (BS, a.k.a. eNodeB) to identify alarm messages almost immediately.
In the remainder of the article, we describe our proposed methods facilitating critical and emergency alarm messages; simulation results are also provided. Finally, architectural discussions and conclusions are drown.
crItIcAl AlArm messAges
Special classes of MTC applications, of great interest to control industries, deal with critical alarm messages (CAMs) [1, 2] , that is, high-priority trigger-based data transmitted by MTC devices (usually fixed) in case of alerts (e.g., overheating, pressure overflow). The design of an effective RA procedure plays a crucial role in fulfilling the strict requirements of CAMs: reliability and security/authenticity.
stAte-of-the-Art In 3gPP rAndom Access for mtc
The 3GPP contention-based RA mechanism for small data transmission [9] (left of Fig. 1 ) consists of a four-message handshake between the MTC user equipment (UE) and the BS.
The procedure starts with the Preamble Transmission (Msg1) on the physical random Access channel (PRACH), a sequence of time-frequency resources (a.k.a. RA slots) the periodicity of which is broadcasted by the BS in the PRACH Configuration Index. In the first available RA slot, the MTC device transmits a preamble randomly chosen within a set of orthogonal pseudo-random preambles. A collision occurs if two or more MTC devices transmit the same preamble in the same RA slot.
If Msg1 is successfully decoded, the BS sends the Random Access Response (Msg2), which contains information about the detected preamble and a grant for the transmission of the Connection Request (Msg3) on the physical uplink shared channel (PUSCH). Finally, a Contention Resolution message (Msg4) terminates the RA procedure and confirms the grant (according to the buffer state report in Msg3) for the subsequent data transmission on the PUSCH.
An undetected Msg1 collision could also involve a Msg3 collision; each colliding device will retransmit Msg3 until the maximum number of allowed attempts before scheduling a new RA attempt after a random backoff time.
Due to the ALOHA-based preamble transmission and the use of random backoffs in the case of failure, the RA performance is heavily constrained in the case of delay-constrained access requests from thousands of MTC devices. The attempts to improve the RA performance are not satisfactory in terms of access delays. This inspired us to propose a 3GPP-compliant method which terminates a secure CAM transmission significantly quicker than the 3GPP-RACH. Our proposal, the SMS-like CAM-RACH, takes inspiration from the method used to transmit SMSs by exploiting control plane connections.
the sms-lIke cAm rAch solutIon:
secure dAtA In msg3
The SMS-like CAM-RACH scheme is an enhancement of the RACH-based standard procedure for secure CAM transmission. Our proposal, which is compliant with the 3GPP-RACH procedure, introduces the following novelties with respect to legacy 3GPP RACH:
• CAM-dedicated preamble set. To guarantee low-latency access, a subset of preambles is reserved for CAMs.
• Predefined CAM types. To reduce the overhead, the network defines different CAM types; the MTC device only transmits the index of the relevant CAM instead of the whole data packet. This saves time, network, and battery resources.
• CAM Msg3. The legacy Msg3's reserved bits are used to convey the encrypted MTC device identity and the CAM index.
In the proposed solution, the eNodeB first broadcasts the information about the CAM-dedicated preamble set and the predefined CAM types. When a device has to transmit a CAM, it sends a randomly selected CAM-dedicated preamble (right of Fig. 1 ). By receiving a CAM-dedicated preamble, the eNodeB is aware of the incoming CAM and sends in Msg2 the grant for the new defined CAM Msg3, which contains the CAM index encrypted with the device's personal key, to guarantee security and authentication. 1 Once Msg3 is received, the eNodeB uses the transmitting device's key to derive the CAM type. The procedure is then terminated with Msg4 (uplink grants are not assigned since the alarm was already notified in CAM Msg3). If the MTC device detects a CAM-RACH failure, it schedules a novel procedure after a backoff period of 10 ms.
It is fair to assume a negligible preamble collision rate for CAM-related MTC devices: by assuming 10 devices transmitting CAMs in an interval of 100 ms and a RACH periodicity of 5 ms, we obtain a CAM transmission every two RA opportunities; that is, the collision probability per RA slot is negligible even when few preambles are reserved for CAM RACH.
Upon receiving the alarm type notification with CAM Msg3, the BS directly transmits the predefined CAM to the final destination (e.g., remote server, actuator). The address translation is achieved through the cloud-based radio access network (RAN) according to the identity of the transmitting MTC device and the CAM type.
sImulAtIons And dIscussIon
An analysis of the proposed encrypted CAM transmission in the CAM-RACH scheme is reported here to assess the achievement of:
The simulation campaign has been carried out through a 3GPP-calibrated 5MHz TDD simulator; cell layout, channel model, and power levels are set according to [7] [8] [9] [10] . MTC devices are located in the central cell of our scenario, while neighboring cells (with background full-buffer traffic so as to act as interfering cells) are located with an inter-site distance of 500 m (macrocell case 1 in [10] ).
We analyze two scenarios: case A, where MTC devices are attached to a macro BS (macrocell system parameters are set in accordance to [10] ); and case B, where a small cell handles [4, 9] , through a nonce generated by the mobility management entity (MME). The eNodeB requests the MME to derive and pass the K CLT by providing a token sent by the device with the first data transmission.
MTC traffic. This latter case is a further innovative proposal to manage machines located in challenging positions by using different 3GPP small cell solutions [5] . We consider a small cell deployed through one femtocell (with system parameters set as in [5] ).
We address a typical industrial scenario, where indoor MTC devices (UE settings in accordance to [10] ) are located in a restricted area (50  50 m), with a mean distance from the macro BS equal to 300 m; all devices are in the femtocell coverage area. We consider a frequency-separated [11] deployment (2 GHz for macro BS and 3 GHz for femtocell) to avoid inter-cell interference; interfering femtocells are not considered in our simulations (in multi-femtocell deployment, interference can be mitigated by proposals in the literature such as [12] ).
Ten randomly chosen terminals transmit CAMs, while the other MTC devices transmit one 200-byte-long data message [9, 10] . Arrival rates of non-CAM devices are uniformly distributed over 20 s. Within this interval, the arrival rates of CAM-related devices are uniformly distributed over 100 ms. The PRACH periodicity is set to 5 ms (PRACH configuration index 6) [9, 10] ; other PRACH parameters are set as in [8] ; and 5 CAM-dedicated preambles are reserved among the 54 contention-based ones. Finally, the CAM index is composed by 8 bits, while the legacy CAM size is 128 bits.
Simulation results are shown in Fig. 2 when increasing the MTC load. The delay (shown on the left) between the CAM generation at the MTC device and its reception by the BS increases with the number of MTC devices due to higher RA congestion. In case A (i.e., macro BS), the delay increases up to 500 ms by considering 15,000 devices, then grows to about 14 s and 13 s for the 3GPP and CAM-RACH schemes, respectively. This increase for the CAM-RACH procedure is given by the PUSCH overload in scenarios with large numbers of MTC devices. For case A, the proposed CAM-RACH guarantees a delay reduction from 10 percent (at high load) to 50 percent (at low load).
The use of small cells (i.e., case B) introduces meaningful delay saving compared to case A due to the short distance (up to 25 m) between the femtocell and the MTC devices: the higher received signal power increases the probability of a successful preamble reception on the first attempt (on the contrary, further retransmissions are necessary to overcome the limitation of higher interference in macrocell scenarios). In detail, our CAM-RACH achieves a delay equal to 20 ms for up to 15,000 devices, then grows to 500 ms for the heavy load of 30,000 terminals. The delay reduction w.r.t. the 3GPP RACH ranges from 50 percent (at high load) to 70 percent (at low load), thus testifying once more to the effectiveness of the proposed solution for low-latency CAM transmission.
The energy consumption is analyzed in Fig.  2 (shown on the right) . The proposed CAM-RACH saves the device's (LTE class 3 UE, 23 dBm maximum transmission power [7, 9] ) battery by reducing the period spent in transmitter, receiver, and fine clock states. Further energy reduction is obtained in case B, where the short distance between femtocell and MTC devices limits preamble retransmissions compared to the macrocell case. In the heavy load scenario with 30,000 MTC devices, our proposed CAM-RACH in case B guarantees an energy reduction close to 95 percent compared to case A of 3GPP RACH.
We further consider the impact of having CAM-dedicated preambles on non-CAM MTC traffic. In our analysis (5 out of 54 preambles reserved for CAM-RACH), the delay of non-CAM MTC traffic is only influenced by a factor of less than 6 percent in the worst case scenario (i.e., 30,000 devices). This result underlines that the proposed CAM-RACH procedure can effectively handle low-latency CAM transmission without significantly impacting the performance of other MTC devices.
emergency AlArm messAges
Another big challenge for cellular network providers is the management of emergency alarm messages (EAMs) [1, 2], which carry trigger-based alerts (usually sent by fixed sensors) requiring immediate action (e.g., to solve industry chain instabilities) and have more stringent delay requirements (expected to be about a few milliseconds) than CAMs. Solving this issue would enable the design of effective industrial MTC business models. With this aim, we propose a novel 3GPP-compliant RA mechanism that exploits a secure sequence of access preambles generated according to the device's cyphering key for EAM transmission.
stAte of the Art In 3gPP PreAmbles
Preambles are orthogonal codes that allow multiple devices to start the RA procedure. Since the available preambles are limited, collisions occur when a massive number of terminals access the network in the same RA slot. Therefore, research studies mainly focus on increasing the number of devices that successfully complete the RA. Among those, [13] proposes a code-expanded RA scheme that significantly increases the amount of contention resources without requiring additional preambles: this is accomplished by using access codewords (i.e., MTC devices transmit orthogonal preambles in a group of consecutive RA slots) instead of a single preamble, and the RA capacity increases due to the availability of a larger codeword set compared to the legacy 3GPP RACH.
In this article, we extend the idea in [13] by associating the EAM transmission to a secure access sequence of L preambles. In this way, an MTC device just needs to transmit its own access sequence to transfer the EAM to the BS, without any data transmission on the PUSCH, with consequent drastic delivery delay and energy consumption reductions.
the eAm-rAch solutIon:
secure dAtA In msg1
The EAM-RACH procedure is designed for EAM transmissions with very low latency and energy consumption through a 3GPP-compliant two-message handshake between the device and the BS. The proposed solution extends the code-expanded scheme by introducing the novel Preambles are orthogonal codes that allow multiple devices to start the RA procedure. Since the available preambles are limited, collisions occur when a massive number of terminals accesses the network in the same RA slot. Therefore, research studies mainly focus on increasing the number of devices that successfully complete the RA.
idea of delivering EAMs through an authorized sequence of access preambles, generated based on the device's private key. The main novelties of the EAM-RACH are:
• The adoption of RACH configuration index #14 (PRACH periodicity of 1ms) to allow a quicker preamble transmission. Techniques such as dynamic time-division duplex (TDD) [11] can be used to dynamically change the PRACH configuration when, based on some target values measured by sensors, the probability of having an EAM transmission increases.
• The use of an EAM preamble sequence s, generated through a hash function H according to the device's key K CLT and, if added security is needed, a timestamp t [14] . The generated sequence is composed of L different preambles chosen from those (already) reserved for non-contention-based access.
• The use of a constantly updated hash table HT at the BS to store the mapping between a given preamble sequence and the related UE-identity. The frequency of HT update increases if the timestamp t is used with the hash function. The EAM-RACH scheme works as follows (Fig. 3) . The BS stores in the HT the sequence of each device associated with its cell. When an MTC device has to send an EAM, it exploits a code-expanded approach by consecutively transmitting in the next L RA slots the preambles in the access sequence s. The preamble length L represents the number of preambles in the sequence s; its value has a twofold impact on the EAM delivery performance: from a security point of view, the higher the value of L the higher the probability of having a secure EAM sequence; from a latency point of view, the lower the value of L, the less time needed to transmit the EAM preamble sequence to the base station. These aspects are analyzed through simulations in the remainder of this section.
When a sequence of L different preambles is received, the BS performs the authentication check by comparing it to the HT. In the case of success, it means that the access sequence was transmitted by an authorized MTC device with a given probability p (refer to the rest of this section for more details), and the BS transmits Msg2 to the temporary address relevant to the last preamble in the sequence. If the device receives Msg2 within the waiting window, it declares the EAM successful; otherwise, a new EAM-RACH procedure is scheduled after a backoff interval of 10 ms. After EAM reception (or several unauthorized attempts), the security keys ought to be updated for security reasons.
sImulAtIons And dIscussIon
A simulation campaign has been carried out to assess the expected benefits of our proposed EAM-RACH. The same simulation settings reported above are used except for the RACH configuration index; we considered 10 preambles for non-contention-based access. The impact that the preamble sequence length L has on EAM delay and security is analyzed in Fig. 4 (the left plot); we plot the probability of an unauthorized EAM transmission (i.e., the probability that an intruder randomly generates an authorized preamble sequence) by varying the preamble length (more details on the calculation of this probability can be found in the remainder of this section). We note that a sequence length L equal to 6 preambles (with, as a consequence, a transmission time of 6 ms) allows a reasonably low unauthorized EAM transmission probability (order of magnitude 10 -6 , i.e., high security). Decreasing the preamble length, we note a drastic increase in the probability of unauthorized EAM transmission (low security). On the contrary, by increasing the preamble length, we can reduce such a probability by only one order of magnitude (down to 10 -7 ), but this involves an increased transmission delay from 2 to 4 ms. According to above results, we fixed the sequence length L to 6 as this setting guarantees an adequate trade-off between security and transmission delay.
We compared the access delay of the proposed EAM-RACH scheme to the 3GPP-and CAM-RACH procedures (the right plot, Fig. 4 ) by considering that only one MTC device transmits EAMs in the whole simulation period.
The results of the 3GPP and CAM-RACH schemes in case A (macrocell scenario) and case B (small cell scenario) are similar to those in Fig.  2 . Indeed, since the 3GPP-RACH does not offer priority differentiation, EAMs experience delay values equal to those in Fig. 2 . Concerning the CAM-RACH, the PUSCH overload in case of huge MTC load influences the EAM delivery delay in a similar trend as for the CAM analysis. In detail, the performance drastically deteriorates when the number of MTC devices is larger than Figure 3 . Time diagram designed for our proposed EAM-RACH procedure (preamble sequence length L = 6). 
It is also worth noting that the delay for the EAM-RACH scheme, which exploits a code-expanded approach to reduce the access collision probability and does not exploit PUSCH resources, is not influenced by the MTC load in the cell. This demonstrates that the proposed mechanism is able to fulfill the delay requirements of critical EAMs without performance degradation for high traffic load. 5000 and 15,000 for case A and B, respectively. The novel EAM-RACH scheme, which does not require any PUSCH resource, guarantees the lowest delay. In the case of success at the first attempt, the EAM transmission takes approximately 10 ms (in both cases A and B). In the case of failure, an additional delay (up to 26 ms in the worst case) is introduced for every EAM sequence retransmission. In case A, as devices are located indoor at the cell edge, the larger coupling losses decrease the received signal power, and as a result, the decoding probability of the first EAM sequence is only 80 percent (thus, the success probability per preamble is close to 96 percent). This leads to an average EAM delay of 15 ms caused by occasional retransmission in the macrocell. As also stated in [5] , the use of small cells (case B) leads to small coupling losses and more than 99 percent decoding probability of the EAM preamble sequence. This results in a low average delay of about 10 ms.
It is also worth noting that the delay for the EAM-RACH scheme, which exploits a code-expanded approach to reduce the access collision probability and does not exploit PUSCH resources, is not influenced by the MTC load in the cell. This demonstrates that the proposed mechanism is able to fulfill the delay requirements of critical EAMs without performance degradation for high traffic load. It is worth noting that our proposed EAM-RACH also introduces meaningful energy savings (not plotted due to lack of space) for MTC devices compared to other schemes (3GPP and CAM-RACH obtain results close to those in Fig. 2) . Indeed, although the EAM-RACH is based on the idea of sending multiple preambles, the very low collision probability with the joint use of a two-message handshake procedure (which drastically limits the number of bits transmitted by devices) allow the energy consumption to be limited; in detail, it varies from 10 mJ to 60 mJ for case A and from 8.5 mJ to 10 mJ for case B.
A summary of the promising results obtained by EAM-RACH is given in Table 1 , which also includes a comparison with 3GPP and CAM-RACH schemes.
Finally, we analyze in more detail the security issues of the proposed EAM-RACH method to demonstrate its robustness. There are three possible ways for an intruder to transmit an authorized preamble sequence.
Generate an authorized key K CLT : The intruder can derive an allowed preamble sequence if it generates the key of a trusted MTC device. With a 128-bit key, the probability p to generate an authorized key is inversely proportional to the overall number of possible 128-bit-long keys. This probability is thus very low (e.g., an order of magnitude of 10 -35 for 30,000 devices).
Generate a random preamble sequence: If the intruder tries to randomly generate an authorized sequence, the probability of achieving an allowed sequence is = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅  p n 1 10 1 9 1 5 (where n is the number of EAM-related devices associated with the BS), thus fairly low (please refer to the left of Fig. 4) . As additional protection, furthermore, the system ought to rekey in the case of detected unauthorized attempt(s).
Exploiting a hash collision: The intruder could generate an allowed access sequence from a non-trusted key (i.e., hash collision). By assuming that the hash function H distributes hash values evenly across the available range of preamble sequences, the hash collision probability, given n authorized MTC devices plus one intruder and N admissible preamble sequences, is
where N = 1.512 · 10 5 in our scenario. Again, the probability is reasonably low.
ArchItecturAl chAllenges
The proposed access schemes with the joint use of small cells [5] also call for architectural improvements to allow signaling and network overload reduction by avoiding the transmission of full IP headers. An example of the enhanced architecture is illustrated in Fig. 5 , where small cells are embodied by femtocells. As motivat- ed by the above simulation results, MTC devices communicate with femtocells, which in turn directly exchange control traffic via the X2 interface. Femtocells are connected to the 3GPP core network via the HeNB-GW, which concentrates control and data traffic, and thus reduces the core network overload by also minimizing the number of signaling connections toward the core network when the number of connected femtocells is huge. Indeed, this solution exploits only one Stream Control Transmission Protocol association between the HeNB-GW and the core network in the control plane as well as only one GPRS Tunneling Protocol connection in the user plane.
The use of a cloud RAN architecture yields several advantages: avoiding the transmission of a full compressed header in the data packets by storing a Network Address Translation list for each MTC device (the cloud RAN performs address translation by considering the UE identity of the transmitting device and the data type); avoiding CAM & EAM data transmission by storing connection-related parameters; allowing dynamic network configuration by tuning the TDD and RA parameterizations according to the traffic measurement monitored by the cloud RAN; and exploiting caching to store and process information for signaling minimization and reliability maximization.
Further solutions are currently under investigation, such as [15] , where a flexible network architecture is proposed allowing core network functions to run at (or close to) the BS sites. Thus, system functionalities can be flexibly allocated to different execution nodes through software defined network and network functions virtualization approaches.
concludIng remArks
We present and assess the effectiveness of two novel RA schemes handling time-critical alarm messages sent by fixed MTC sensors over future cloud-RAN-enabled 3GPP networks.
Focusing on CAM transmission, the proposed solution allows significant delay and energy savings by transmitting CAM data in Msg3 of the RA procedure, thus reducing the PUSCH overload and increasing the number of supported devices. Concerning EAM management, we present a novel approach where EAM data is directly transmitted through a secure preamble sequence, which allows the BS to quickly identify the EAM without the need for any data transmission by the terminal.
The detailed design and protocol optimization of the cloud-RAN architecture is left for future work. 
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